What I'm arguing against

Here's exactly what I'm arguing against (lightly edited by me):

As human beings we are capable of viewing ourselves and our values from two very different standpoints. On the one hand is what I'll call (borrowing Kantian language), the practical standpoint...When I occupy the practical standpoint I think that judgments about normative reasons are true. On the other hand is what I'll call the theoretical standpoint. When we occupy this point of view on ourselves and our values I understand my normative judgments as being shaped by such causes as my upbringing, cultural background and inherited psychological tendencies."

This is Sharon Street (who studied under Korsgaard who in turn was very influenced by Nagel's discussion of the Objective and Subjective standpoints). From this distinction between the practical and the theoretical, Street argues that if we're moral realists we won't be able to reconcile these two standpoints, and since we do need to reconcile these two standpoints, so much the worse for moral realism.

My thesis, in a nutshell, is to deny that the theoretical standpoint looks as she describes it. I start by noting that the theoretical standpoint is guided by norms as well. We, essentially, have to take an inner perspective when it comes to thinking about the theoretical standpoint, because the outer perspective is completely ungoverned. So as long as we're thinking and reasoning we're taking an inner view (like the one that she says is characteristic of the practical standpoint) in the theoretical standpoint. And this means that there's room for the practical standpoint in the theoretical world.

After I argue that there is such room, I have to argue that epistemology does something else for us, which is that it helps point to ways that ethics doesn't conflict internally with the world of belief and theory. But that's something else.