Chapter 4--Normative Psychology
"Competing Systems of Control"--He starts by thinking about "weakness of will" cases. In this section Gibbard distinguishes between animal control system and the normative control system. The normative control system is posited to be only a motivating force for humans, and to have a lot to do with language. A norm is a linguistically encoded precept. The normative control system has a lot to do with language, and that "a lot" has to do with coordination problems and planning problems. This is just supposed to be a good start, not the end of the story. But in this section we get conflicts between normative and animal control systems.
"Conflicts with Social Motivations"--In this section we get conflicts with social motivations and the normative control system. Above we didn't have conflicts between norms. This time we have conflicts between norms. But it's not symmetric. It's the difference between two psychological states, that of accepting a norm and that of being in the grip of a norm.
"Biological Adaptation"--Some scientific speculation. He admits that more solid investigation is needed, and he invites it. The biological function of a faculty for accepting and being governed by norms is coordination. The capacity to accept norms and being in their grip are both coordination systems, though the former is distinctly human, and depends on language.
"The Biology of Coordination"--"It is in the role of language in coordinating behavior and expectations, I shall be suggesting, that we can discern what is special about accepting norms."
"Internalizing Norms"--This term refers to what being in the grip of a norm and accepting a norm have in common. Animals are capable of internalizing norms. No decision involved, it's just built into their instincts. e.g. conversational distance. Sophisticated observers can formulate these norms, though usually those who respect the norms aren't able to even notice them. "What then might we mean here by a norm? By the norm itself I suggest, we should mean simply a prescription or imperative that gives the rule a sophisticated observer could formulate." To internalize a norm is to have a motivational tendency to act on that pattern.
"Accepting Norms"--"The state of accepting a norm is identified b its place in a syndrome of tendencies toward action and avowal. This has to do with the language-infused system of coordination peculiar to humans. We accept norms in the context of normative discusion, actual and imaginary. We take positions and thereby expose ourselves to deamnds for consistency.
"Acceptance, Action, Persuasion"
"Normative Discussion and Philosophy" [Skipped these sections.]
Thursday, April 29, 2010
Reading, Gibbard, Chap 3
Chapter 3: Analysis Broached
"What is Appraised as Rational or Not"--in this section he argues that beliefs, actions and emotions can all be appraised as rational or not. Some say that only voluntary things can be rationally appraised, but Gibbard thinks that beliefs are a counter-example to this, and actions aren't entirely voluntary anyway (since they have to do with intentions, which aren't entirely voluntary, I think). So there's nothing against emotions being rationally appraised, which is what he really needs for his account. You might say that emotions are rationally appraised to the extent that they're based on beliefs that can be rationally appraised (as Hume argued), but Gibbard argues that these beliefs would have to be subconscious, and only make themselves present to the extent that the person gets angry, so you might as well just say that anger is rationally evaluated.
"Rationality and Morality"--Gibbard makes several distinctions in this section in order to focus in on morality, and to give an analysis of the relationship between morality and rationality. First, he distinguishes subjective from objective morality. Subjective morality is what an agent should do given his beliefs and knowledge, and objective morality is what an agent should do if she had perfect knowledge, or something. Gibbard says that he sees no interest in objective morality, so he's only interested in the subjective stuff. Then he distinguishes between blameworthiness and morality, so that he's only giving an account of morality (which is forward looking, as opposed to blameworthiness, which is retrospective). As an account of blameworthiness he gives "iff it is rational for the agent to feel guilty over the act and for others to resent him for it." Instead, he gives an account for moral wrongness: "an act is wrong if and only if it violates standards for ruling out actions, such that if an agent in a normal frame of mind violated those standards because he was not substantially motivated to conform to them, he would be to blame." So it's an account of morality built out of the retrospective attitude of blame. Blame depends on standards of subjective wrongness and standards for responsibility, so Gibbard defines what a moral wrong is by blocking out one of the factors for blame (the standards for responsibility).
"The Norm-Expressivistic Analysis"--The previous section gave an analysis of morality, and here we get a provisional analysis of rationality. "Put roughly and cryptically, my hypothesis is that to think something rational is to accept norms that permit it." Accepting norms is a state of mind, so naturally basic. "An observer believes an action, belief, or attitude A of mine to be rational if and only if he accepts norms that permit A for my circumstances." We here get the idea that "moral norms are norms for the rationality of guilt and resentment."
"Second Thoughts"--He clarifies what he means by rationality, and I skimmed this section. Same with morality. He's interested not in what the terms mean, but rather with the particular meanings that he's associating with them. He's happy to call these terms something else.
"Structural Problems"--On this account, the question "Is it ever rational not to be moral" makes perfect sense. Likewise, we can understand perfectly well what it means to ask whether the "moral ought implies can." Another question also makes sense: "It morality of value?" The norm-expressivistic analysis gives us an interpretation of this question too: "Is it a good thing for norms for guilt and resentment to play a big role in our lives? Or might other kinds of motivation...bring many of the same benefits without the same costs." (See Nietzsche). All he's doing is showing how powerful and flexible his framework is, and trying to show you that it is a good analysis of what's been going on this whole time. "Familiar problems can be put in new form, as questions about the structure of well-founded sentiments."
"What is Appraised as Rational or Not"--in this section he argues that beliefs, actions and emotions can all be appraised as rational or not. Some say that only voluntary things can be rationally appraised, but Gibbard thinks that beliefs are a counter-example to this, and actions aren't entirely voluntary anyway (since they have to do with intentions, which aren't entirely voluntary, I think). So there's nothing against emotions being rationally appraised, which is what he really needs for his account. You might say that emotions are rationally appraised to the extent that they're based on beliefs that can be rationally appraised (as Hume argued), but Gibbard argues that these beliefs would have to be subconscious, and only make themselves present to the extent that the person gets angry, so you might as well just say that anger is rationally evaluated.
"Rationality and Morality"--Gibbard makes several distinctions in this section in order to focus in on morality, and to give an analysis of the relationship between morality and rationality. First, he distinguishes subjective from objective morality. Subjective morality is what an agent should do given his beliefs and knowledge, and objective morality is what an agent should do if she had perfect knowledge, or something. Gibbard says that he sees no interest in objective morality, so he's only interested in the subjective stuff. Then he distinguishes between blameworthiness and morality, so that he's only giving an account of morality (which is forward looking, as opposed to blameworthiness, which is retrospective). As an account of blameworthiness he gives "iff it is rational for the agent to feel guilty over the act and for others to resent him for it." Instead, he gives an account for moral wrongness: "an act is wrong if and only if it violates standards for ruling out actions, such that if an agent in a normal frame of mind violated those standards because he was not substantially motivated to conform to them, he would be to blame." So it's an account of morality built out of the retrospective attitude of blame. Blame depends on standards of subjective wrongness and standards for responsibility, so Gibbard defines what a moral wrong is by blocking out one of the factors for blame (the standards for responsibility).
"The Norm-Expressivistic Analysis"--The previous section gave an analysis of morality, and here we get a provisional analysis of rationality. "Put roughly and cryptically, my hypothesis is that to think something rational is to accept norms that permit it." Accepting norms is a state of mind, so naturally basic. "An observer believes an action, belief, or attitude A of mine to be rational if and only if he accepts norms that permit A for my circumstances." We here get the idea that "moral norms are norms for the rationality of guilt and resentment."
"Second Thoughts"--He clarifies what he means by rationality, and I skimmed this section. Same with morality. He's interested not in what the terms mean, but rather with the particular meanings that he's associating with them. He's happy to call these terms something else.
"Structural Problems"--On this account, the question "Is it ever rational not to be moral" makes perfect sense. Likewise, we can understand perfectly well what it means to ask whether the "moral ought implies can." Another question also makes sense: "It morality of value?" The norm-expressivistic analysis gives us an interpretation of this question too: "Is it a good thing for norms for guilt and resentment to play a big role in our lives? Or might other kinds of motivation...bring many of the same benefits without the same costs." (See Nietzsche). All he's doing is showing how powerful and flexible his framework is, and trying to show you that it is a good analysis of what's been going on this whole time. "Familiar problems can be put in new form, as questions about the structure of well-founded sentiments."
Reading Gibbard, I
"The analysis is non-cognitivistic in the narrow sense that, according to it, to call a thing rational is not to state a matter of fact, either truly or falsely. None of this leaves normative language defective or second-rate. The analysis explains why we need normative language, and as it takes shape, it ascribes to rationality many of the features on which theories of normative fact insist. In many ways, normative judgments mimic factual judgments, and indeed factual judgments themselves rest on norms--norms for belief. Normative discussion is much like factual discussion, I shall be claiming, and just as indispensable."
I really need to keep this in mind when thinking about expressivism. Because of the 60s I tend to think of non-cognitivism as looking down on ethics and other normative talk, but it's really not doing that in today's age. What is at stake--the only thing at stake--is whether one can say of normative statements that they're true or false.
I really need to keep this in mind when thinking about expressivism. Because of the 60s I tend to think of non-cognitivism as looking down on ethics and other normative talk, but it's really not doing that in today's age. What is at stake--the only thing at stake--is whether one can say of normative statements that they're true or false.
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