Introduction to Chapter 2, or, What makes my thesis too ambitious?

In the previous chapter I argued that it is not possible to give an epistemic reason in favor of Epistemic Anti-Realism. One way of putting the difficulty we encountered is in the following way: one is either challenging Epistemic Realism from within or without epistemology. The challenge can’t come from outside of epistemology, because there are no reasons to believe that are prior to epistemology. On the other hand, I argued that there is no way for the challenge to come from within epistemology either. This is because one is never able to challenge the legitimacy of a system of norms—an external accusation—from within that system of norms. There is something else that one can do, but this is a challenge for epistemology, not a challenge against it.

My motivation remains a desire to investigate the plausibility of Moral Realism, and the discussion towards the end of the last chapter applied the earlier discussion to an attempt to ground Moral Realism in Epistemic Realism. I argued that such accounts fail in a systematic way.

In this chapter my discussion will follow a similar pattern. As in the last chapter, I will investigate a foundational, basic question in epistemology. My concern will be whether the arbitrary can be completely eliminated from Epistemology, even from an Epistemic Realist’s perspective. I will enter into this difficult discussion through a paper by David Enoch and Joshua Shechter, “How are Basic Belief-Forming Methods Justified?” Engaging with their ideas has been very helpful in developing my own, and I believe that it will ease us into a consideration of whether the arbitrary can be eliminated from epistemology. I will argue that they fail to eliminate the arbitrary from epistemology, and for good reason—the arbitrary cannot be completely eliminated from the Epistemic Realist’s picture of epistemology.

There are two pressing concerns that I think deserve to be raised against this account. The first concern is that this picture predicts far too much disagreement between otherwise competent believers. How is there so much consensus? I will give an account of the restraints that believers face that can explain the consensus. A second concern follows quickly after this one: how is it possible for an Epistemic Realist to recognize that there is a degree of arbitrariness in our epistemology, that some things that we accept truly are basic? This is a serious question, and I wish to grapple with it at length in my final chapter.

If this argument is right, then here’s the picture that we emerge with: if we accept Epistemic Realism there is a certain arbitrariness in our epistemic beliefs that emerges. Nothing, epistemically speaking, can count either for or against our most basic epistemic beliefs. Quickly our epistemic beliefs pile up, and the way to understand the constraints on our epistemology is that epistemic beliefs pile up and can come in conflict with each other, forcing us to choose between competing principles.

Given this understanding, I will argue that the Moral Realist’s best option is to conceive of moral beliefs as justified by some epistemic principle that he might take as basic. There is nothing in epistemology that governs these basic choices, and so the Moral Realist cannot be epistemically criticized for this decision, as long as his Realism doesn’t conflict with any of his other principles. Of course, Anti-Realists contend that Realism does conflict with many other epistemic principles, and Realism cannot be defended without eliminating these objections. But such an approach gives the Realist a precise way to shift the burden of proof onto the Anti-Realist, something Realists often talk about imprecisely.

Finally, before beginning I need to make a confession: I am not up to the task of completely answering the questions that I am raising. The questions that I raise, I believe, are some of the deepest that can be asked, and answering them completely would involve a remarkable philosophical achievement. I don’t believe that I can do that, and I especially don’t think that I can do that in this space. So I will do my best, but even if I don’t succeed completely I will consider my project a success if I can convince the reader that an approach similar to mine is the right one for the Moral Realist.