A shift in Frege's thoughts about epistemology and ethics?

"Like ethics, logic can also be called a normative science. How must I think in order to reach the goal, truth? We expect logic to give us the answer to this question, but we do not demand of it that it should go into what is peculiar to each branch of knowledge and its subject matter. On the contrary, the task we assign logic is only that of saying what holds with the utmost generality for all thinking, whatever its subject matter. We must assume that the rules for our thinking and for our holding something to be true are prescribed by the laws of truth....Logic is the science of the most general laws of truth."

Frege, Logic. In contrast to (Early) Wittgenstein's specification of logic as dealing entirely with tautologies, it seems to me that it doesn't hurt to think of Frege as just an epistemic realist, someone who thinks that there really are general norms about what to believe. In this essay, Frege seems to be putting these two sorts of norms on the same page. But look at this quote from "Thought."

"The word 'law' is used in two senses. When we speak of moral or civil laws we mean prescriptions , which ought to be obeyed but with which actual occurrences are not always in conformity. Laws of nature are general features of what happens in nature, and occurrences in nature are always in accordance with them. It is rather in this sense that I speak of laws of truth...I assign to logic the task of discovering the laws of truth, not the laws of taking things to be true or thinking."

The second essay is later by about 20 years. He does think that laws governing thought follow from the laws of logic, but that these are quite separate. Here's another passage from Thought:

"From the laws of truth there follow prescriptions about asserting, thinking, judging, inferring. And we may very well speak of laws of thought in this way too. But there is at once a danger here of confusing things. People may very well interpret the expression 'law of thought' by analogy with 'law of nature' and then have in mind general features of thinking as a mental occurrence..."

His point is that he doesn't want someone to think that logic should be identified with those things that guide thought, because that would eliminate the objectivity of logic, giving it a psychologistic explanation. But how should we understand him here, then? If logic itself does not contain norms governing thought, and is rather a part of our description of the most general features of the universe, how do we end up with norms from logic? There seems to be an is/ought gap here.