Hashing out the third chapter

Now we're two down, one to go. This one is going to be particularly difficult, since I basically need to write it on the fly. In other words, the first two chapters are ideas that I've had for a while, written down in various versions and refined over the course of weeks and months. The content of this third chapter...not so much. Tomorrow's the day, though, and before I call it a night I want to think a bit about where this chapter's going.

I concluded the previous chapter by stating that what remains for the moral realist is to show that his view doesn't conflict with the rest of our/his epistemology. One of the anti-realist argumens that he faces is the reliability challenge. Properly adjusted, however, and a similar argument applies to epistemology.

So, here's the plan of the final chapter: Start by discussing what remains for the moral realist to do. Establish a properly adjusted parity argument for epistemology and ethics. Outline different responses from realists that have come so far, showing that they weren't always answering the right question (ala Enoch), and then offer my own perspective. I'm a bit nervous about offering my own perspective, since my own perspective hasnt been written down clearly ever, but my idea is that we can swallow our pride and just admit that there is a sort of miracle going on here. But the sort of crazy coincidence that we have to assume is fairly limited--it's that our intuitions aren't that far off. You have to do that if you're going to have any knowledge anyway, since a certain kind of skeptical concern is always possible. In a way, my argument is that this is that this is the input that produces the realist output; the input is the faith that our intuitions aren't wildly divergent with the way that the world actually is.