Chapter Three

I'm actually just starting this one. Here's the introduction, anyway:

In the first chapter I argued that there are no possible epistemic reasons to doubt epistemic realism. The second chapter argued that being an epistemic realist involves a degree of arbitrariness. Despite this potential arbitrariness, the vast majority of people are committed to pretty much the same epistemology. The moral realist, however, can take advantage of this potential for unobjectionable arbitrariness by choosing an epistemology that is sympathetic towards his realism. This only allows the realist to get his foot in the door, however, since the anti-realist objects that there are tensions internal to the realist’s epistemology. Presumably, the moral realist is not willing to dissociate himself from most of the world by radically revising his epistemic principles to line up with his realism. This means that his only available option is to disarm the anti-realist objections so that the tension internal to his epistemology is eliminated.

In this thesis I am not up to the task of defending moral realism against all the anti-realist objections. Instead, I will focus on one powerful anti-realist objection, the reliability challenge. This objection alleges that the moral realist is unable to explain how it is that so many of his moral beliefs turn out to be true. I focus on this objection for two reasons. First, it is considered by many to be the most disturbing objection to moral realism. Second, because I believe that reflecting on how the objection might apply to epistemology can help us gain perspective on the problem.

I will conclude this chapter, and the thesis, hoping to have convinced the reader of two things. First, that my approach towards a defense of moral realism is a promising one for the realist. Second, that continued reflection on epistemology is capable of yielding considerable insight on ethics.