Could our account help deal with the epistemic access/reliability problem for ethics?

I think it might. I don't have time to go through the idea carefully now, but here's the idea. I'll begin by quoting Cuneo:

"The fourth argument in the antirealist repertoire can be stated briefly. This argument starts with the observation that we don't have any explanatorily informative story about how we could gain epistemic access to moral facts. That is, we do not have any informative account of how facts about what morally ought to be the case impinge on our cognitive faculties so as to produce the corresponding states of knowledge. And it is difficult to imagine what type of story could be told. In light of this failure, it is best to conclude that there is no explanation available. But on the assumption that, if moral facts were to exist, then some explanation would be available, it follows that moral facts do not exist."

"I think that it should be admitted that this argument poses a serious challenge to moral realism. But I take it to be fairly plain that the argument poses an equally serious challenge to epistemic realism. For if it is the normative nature of moral facts that is supposed to debar us from an informative story about how we grasp them, then the same holds for epistemic facts. And if it is the lack of an informative story of how we grasp moral facts that implies that we ought not to admit them into our ontology then the same holds for epistemic facts. Considerations of the same sort counsel against the acceptance of the existence of both moral and epistemic facts."

The first hint that there is something strange here is that what's being asked for is an epistemology for epistemic realism. And I think that the story that I've been telling can tell the story of how we come to know epistemic facts--if epistemic realism is taken, etc.--and that this might be able to help moral realism in the same way. But I need to think more seriously about this and the other arguments.