Chapter One

I just finished a full draft of my first chapter. Here's the introduction:

I believe that there can be no epistemic reason for believing or rejecting epistemic realism. As a consequence, belief in realism is epistemically optional and it is impossible to criticize someone on epistemic grounds for being an realist. My primary goal in this chapter is to defend this claim. Here’s my plan of attack: I begin by presenting epistemic realism and anti-realism. Anti-realists typically believe that they have objections to epistemic realism; indeed, this is what motivates their views. I will argue that the anti-realists are wrong to believe that there are reasons to reject epistemic realism, because it is impossible to have such a reason.
I then discuss an argument offered by Terence Cuneo in his book, “The Normative Web.” He argues for moral realism, on the grounds that any objection against moral realism applies with equal strength to epistemic realism. Drawing on the conclusions I reach in the earlier parts of the chapter, I will argue that since there are no reasons for or against epistemic realism, Cuneo’s argument is flawed.
Epistemic realists shouldn’t get too excited, though, since I will also argue there aren’t any good epistemic reasons for the realist view. What this means is that belief in epistemic realism is epistemically optional. Most beliefs are governed by epistemic norms; epistemic realism isn’t. It is above the epistemic fray, so to speak.