Ways in which this thesis is flawed

It's a bit strange to argue against parity of ethics and epistemology with regard to arguments for moral anti-realism, when I might think that some of the arguments might not stick. For example, right now I'm reading about the argument from disagreement (Gowans, Brink and Enoch are all excellent), and I'm not sure how convinced I am that there is a problem for moral realism with disagreement. But yet I'm arguing against parity?

I think that the point is that in this thesis, what I'm heading towards, is the view that there are no shortcuts for taking on the arguments for moral anti-realism one by one. Epistemology (I hope!) can help with this project, but there's no way to take a shortcut to moral realism through epistemic realism. The work that needs to be done is slow and dirty, but full of more insight than the shortcuts. And so I think that's my justification for taking on parity. It's against the argument that there is a shortcut.