Being more precise

We might even agree with Cuneo that disagreements such as "It is rationally permissible to cling to religious beliefs in the face of contrary evidence provided by our best science" is a first-order epistemic sentence. But note that it is a general, as opposed to a particular one. If we were to say, instead, "We're justified in believing that evolution is false because the Bible says so" the sentence is no longer plausibly viewed as an epistemic sentence. Rather, it's a scientific or religious sentence, but if this is an epistemic sentence than ALL sentences are epistemic, since from any plain old descriptive sentence "There's a tree over there" we can get a normative claim such as "I know that there's a tree over there" or "I'm justified in the belief that there's a tree over there." The point is that when it comes down to specifics and particulars it's hard to see how you could have a first-order epistemic sentence.

My futher claim is that the kind of disagreement that we should find interesting is first-order particular disagreements. This is the kind of lasting disagreement that we find striking in ethics.

This is still wrong, because I'm abusing the particular/general distinction, but I think that there is something here.