Tuesday, February 23, 2010

Intuitionism and Epistemology

There is a certain sense in which I'm defending a kind of intuitionism about epistemology. On the account I've been writing about, what plays the role of an intuition are epistemically optional beliefs. They are intuitions in the sense that they are our most obvious beliefs, but there is a reason why they are our most obvious beliefs: because they are our most basic beliefs, and so they play a central role in our webs of belief, so to speak. What this means is that a principle like IBE (if it's basic) is not believed because we have reason to think that it's true, but rather out of a pure intuition--that is, we make an epistemicially optional choice to believe in it. Same with epistemic realism: it's a pure choice, made for no reason having to do with the truth. This is what an intuition could be.

Then there is a sense in which we might be able to defend a corresponding kind of moral intuitionism, at least in theory. Now, epistemic realism is at the very very foundations of our theoretical world, and moral realism plays no such role. But perhaps there is some belief that we may take as basic that does not interfere with out our other basic epistemic principles. This would make it epistemically optional, and then there would be a sense in which belief in certain ethical principles is an intuition.

This is one way of reading Enoch, I think. I think that there are two problems with Enoch. The first is that the I'm not sure why we should take as basic the pragmatic principle--it doesn't seem to get us anywhere. Second, is that unless you deal with all the arguments against moral realism first, the argument is implausible because your moral principle will conflict with your epistemic principles about explanation (for example).

But perhaps the following is a programme:
1. Show that ethics does not conflict with our other epistemic beliefs
2. Then you can take some ethical principle as basic.
3. Then you believe in ethics and can't be blamed for it.

That might just be another way of formulating the question that isn't helpful. But I'm tired, and that's all for tonight.

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