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Ethics and Epistemology

Monday, February 1, 2010

Enoch says that metanormative realism is justified, because it's indispensable to our deliberative project. We simply must deliberate over what to decide--it's non-optional. Am I missing something, or does deliberation need nothing beyond hypothetical imperatives, as opposed to categorical ones? Is his view entirely consistent with a kind of relativism?
Posted by Michael Pershan at 8:14 PM

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