Summing up the previous post in a few sentences

What I began expressing in the previous post was the following picture:

There are some statements that are first-order ethical statements. There are also second-order statements about ethical concepts. There are also some second-order statements about epistemic concepts. But I'm tempted to think that there are no first-order epistemic statements. This is because the first-order sentences about what to believe don't seem to me to really be about epistemology, but the purely epistemic sentences seem to me to be second-order.

My reason for thinking in this way is from Cuneo's example of religious disagreement. It seems to me that if that's an instance of epistemic disagreement, then it's because what these people are really arguing about is the second-order issue itself, directly. Otherwise, it's not really an epistemic disagreement, because if that was considered an epistemic disagreement then ANY disagreement would be an epistemic disagreement, since every disagreement is epistemic in the way that religious disagreement is. Why? Because all disagreements can be translated into epistemic terms, since all disagreements are concerned with what is rational to believe, or what one ought to believe. In other words, they're all arguments.