Questions I want to know the answers to

1. If epistemology is normative (as it seems to be), and if many of the arguments against moral realism can plausibly be extended to epistemic realism (as Cuneo argues), how can we explain the common sense belief that epistemic realism is more secure than ethical realism? Are we just making a gross error?

2. If epistemic and mathematical entities are indispensable to science (as realists in both camps claim), then how come our access to scientific facts is generally taken to be more evident than our access to epistemic and mathematical facts? Are we just making a gross error?

3. Cuneo claims that "some moral and epistemic facts are mutually implicative" (79). Is this because for any discourse X, X facts and epistemic facts are mutually implicative?

4. Is there any interesting sense in which mathematical and highly theoretical facts are normative? (I should add: probably not.)