The Argument from Queerness and Epistemic Norms

Scanlon, "What We Owe to Each Other", p.59

"Accepting a judgment that X is a reason for doing A seems to involve an element of normative commitment to, or endorsement of, a normative conclusion, an element that may be thought to be missing from the acceptance of a mere judgment of fact...[further:] such an account will construe 'taking something to be a reason' as a belief in a kind of non-natural fact that many regard as metaphysically odd...it may help to diminish this tendency toward skepticism to emphasize that the considerations I have just been discussing apply to reasons of all kinds--to reasons for belief as well as to reasons for action...so what we are concerned with here is not a distinction between facts and values, or between theoretical and practical reason, as these dichotomies are normally understood."

Sayre-McCord, "Moral Theory and Explanatory Impotence": "Once it has been granted that some explanations are better than others, many obstacles to a defense of moral values disappear. In fact, all general objections to the existence of value must be rejected as too strong. Moreover, whatever ontological niche and epistemological credentials we find for explanatory values will presumably serve equally well for moral values. (Of course, this leaves open the possibility that more specific attacks may be leveled at moral values; the point is just that once epistemic values are allowed, no general arguments against the existence of values can work."

Terence Cuneo, "The Normative Web": "Let's suppose for the moment that moral realists really are committed to the claim that moral facts are intrinsically motivating. Do we have any reason to think that epistemic facts are different in this respect?"