Friday, January 22, 2010

Hypothetical and Categorical Reasons

The distinction seems right to me: there are some reasons--like sports reasons--that provide reasons to act but only if you care about them--only if you care about playing football well. There are other things--such as ethical reasons--that apply to a person even if he doesn't care about them. We would probably agree that someone who doesn't care about the outcome of a sports game doesn't have much of a good reason to follow the rules of football during a certain time, but we wouldn't agree that someone who doesn't care about ethics has no reason not to kill! So the distinction makes sense to me.

But for a while I've been puzzled about how a realist could explain this. Doesn't this seem like an odd feature of the world, that you have all these norms that are hypothetical, and they (we surely agree) are not objective features of the world, but then you have one sort of norm that is objective and an actual feature of the world? Isn't this something that the realist needs to explain? Or am I missing something. If anything pushes me to constructivism, this is it. But does this make any sense? Do I have any readers? If I have any readers, could you explain this to me?

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