Differences between ethic and epistemology

Cuneo emphasizes certain similarities between ethics and epistemology, features that they share. There are also, without a doubt, differences between the two, and Cuneo mentions some of them.

It doesn't matter, for his core argument, if there are differences between ethics and epistemology as long as these differences are irrelevant. What do I mean be irrelevant? Two things. First, the differences can't play a role in any of the anti-realist arguments. It can't be that a difference between ethics and epistemology can explain why we would make an anti-realist argument in ethics but not in epistemology. That would sink the ship. Second, it can't be that a difference between ethics and epistemology overrides the anti-realist concerns, such that it's a positive reason to believe in epistemic realism.

So let's start cataloging some of the differences. I think Cuneo, to his credit, gets a lot of them.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ETHICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY:

1. (Cuneo p.98) "Moral motivation is more intimately connected with feelings of guilt than epistemic ones" or along the same line of thought "We do not typically claim that epistemic obligations are overriding, nor do we claim that failing to conform to them warrants guilt."
2. (Cuneo p.106) "The type of argument under consideration is one that concerns the explanatory role of moral and epistemic facts. It does not, however, deny that there may be interesting differences between the explanatory roles of moral concepts, on the one hand, and epistemic concepts, on the other. It might be, for example, that epistemic concepts are more entrenched in our best science and metaphysics than moral ones."
3. Even if virtue ethics/epistemology is right and far more things are evaluated then it typically thought in each realm, ethics primarily evaluates actions. Epistemology, on the other hand, primarily evaluates beliefs. This evaluation of beliefs is second order in a way that typical ethics (evaluating ethics) is not.
4. Consequentialism is far less attractive in epistemology than it is in ethics. People argue for it, but it seems far less attractive to say that you're justified in believing one false thing in order to believe 5 true things, than it is to say that you're choosing the course that will cause you to save more lives. This is a matter of debate, though.
5. On a related note, ethics regularly evaluates states of affairs that have nothing to do with humans or actors. We might say that war is an evil, that an operation is a good thing or that a certain weapon is an evil thing, or that the current healthcare system is morally problematic because it causes suffering, though we blame no particular actor. All of these could probably be reduced to claims about actors (when we morally evaluate the country's healthcare situation negatively we're really evaluating the performance of the country as a corporate actor). I'm not sure if this is a real difference, or if all these cases can be eliminated without trouble. But consequentialists, apparently, don't think that these things can be eliminated. Because they analyze what it means for an actor to do the right or wrong thing in terms of whether a situation of state of affairs is a good or bad one. So apparently there are states of affairs that are good or bad independent of actors. But is there any way to think of evaluating a situation or a state of affairs in an epistemic way? I'm not sure. Would that be like saying that a historical method is unjustified? Is this not really a difference at all? Maybe not. Hermmm.

Not sure if any of these are relevent (the one about cloesness to science, I think, could probably be interesting when we start to talk about forming an indispensability argument for epistemology, which will be very soon). Need to add to the list, refine the list, think about what the list means.