Companions in Guilt

Let there be two discourses, A and B, and we're trying to figure out whether A is real or not.

Here's an abstraction of a companions in guilt argument:

(1) If A isn't real, then B isn't real. (Premise) (So it follows that B isn't real)
(2) But B is real. (Premise)
(3) A is real. (1-2)

How do we know (1) and (2) are true?

(1): Suppose that there were a reason to think that B is real that is not also a reason to believe that A is real. Then would (1) still be plausible? No, because it could be that A isn't real because it doesn't have B's good feature. So the plausibility of (1) depends on there being no reason to believe that B is real that isn't also a reason to believe that A is real.

(2): We have some reason for thinking that B is real. Suppose that this reason for thinking B is real is also a reason for thinking that A is real. Then we wouldn't need the above argument at all, rather, we would be able to argue that: B is real, and if B is real then it follows that A is real, so A is real by a simple modus ponens. So either the above argument is unnecessary, or there is a reason to believe that B is real that is not also a reason to believe that A is real.

But now (1) and (2) seem to stand in tension. What makes (1) plausible is that there's no good reason to believe that B is real that isn't also a reason to believe that A is real. But what we saw was that either the above argument isn't really necessary (since our reason for thinking B is real is just as good for thinking A is real) or the reason for thinking that B is real is not also a reason for thinking that A is real. So if the companions in guilt style argument I presented above is necessary to prove the reality of A, then it seems to be struck with internal tension.

Now, Cuneo's core argument is:

(1) If moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist.
(2) Epistemic facts exist.
(3) Moral facts exist.

Why should we believe (1)? Only if there is no reason to think that epistemic facts exist that isn't also a reason to think that moral facts exist. Why should we believe (2)? Because we have reason to believe that epistemic facts exist. Do these reason(s) also apply to moral facts? If they do, then we don't need the companion in guilt argument, so if we do need the above argument, then there's a reason to believe that epistemic facts exist that isn't a reason to think that moral facts exist. And so we have no good reason to believe (1) anymore.

In chapter 8 Cuneo recognizes this as a possible objection to his argument, but all I'm trying to say here is that it's not just a possible interpretation of the data, but rather that the tension is an inevitable feature of these sorts of arguments.

Now, what can one respond to this? It seems clear that we have a reason to believe in epistemology that isn't a reason to believe in ethics. Is there any reason to believe (1) under these circumstances? Yes, if you think that the following is true: if the features that ethics and epistemology share are not just problematic, but they're REALLY problematic, and would overpower whatever reason we have to think that epistemology is real. In other words, having that good feature would not be sufficient to override the bad features.

So here’s a fuller version of the argument:

(A) Moral facts do not exist only if [For any discourse, if a discourse has the "problematic features" then the discourse is not real even if it is indispensable for theorizing.]
(B) Epistemic facts have these same set of “problematic features.”
(C) Epistemic facts do not exist, even if they are indispensable for theorizing.
(1) So, if moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist. (A-C)
(2) Epistemic facts exist, because they are indispensable for theorizing.
(3) Moral facts exist.

So now we have a contradiction, so what went wrong? The problem can't be (1) or (C), and so (A) and (B) are suspect. Cuneo argues that (B) is true, so let’s give him that. And I guess what we’re supposed to see is the falsity of (A). So if (A) is false, then the following conditional is false:

(A’) If [For any discourse, if a discourse has the “problematic features” then the discourse is not real even if it is indispensable for theorizing] then moral facts do not exist.

That (A’) is false means that it could be true that in general the “problematic features” kill a discourse, but that moral facts exist nonetheless. This means that moral facts must be missing the problematic features.

I still feel really uneasy with this argument, because the contradiction doesn't seem surprising at all. If we think that being indispensable to theorizing (or whatever reasons we have for thinking that epistemic facts exist) are really knock down considerations, then why on earth would we think that the problematic features could override them? In general, I just have no good reason to believe (A), especially given the fact that the considerations in favor of believing the reality of epistemology are supposed to be so very strong. So I'm inclined to doubt (A).

So here's what I'm going to do now. First, I'm going to try to look at the rest of the arguments that support (B), specifically the argument from disagreement (an argument that Cuneo marks as being the one that perhaps favor epistemology over ethics). At this point I'm willing to concede the first four arguments. I've expressed a bit of skepticism already about the explanatory requirement being a problem equally for epistemology as it is for ethics--though I should probably make sure that I'm not failing to think of epistemology in a sufficiently normative way.

After that, though, I'll just give Cuneo (B). And I think this point is why I'm not sure that there's much of a good reason to believe the core argument.

But Cuneo's got one more argument, and that's presented rather quickly in Chapter 8 in response to this argument.

Then I've got to figure out what can be taken from this. I think that the idea there is going to be that we need to figure out how to make sense of the queerness of normativity, because Cuneo has successfully shown that epistemic facts exist and that they would be normative and so queer. Maybe we can distinguish between the normativity/queerness of ethics and epistemology, or maybe we can focus on one of these first four arguments to try and figure out why those problematic features are not problematic.