Looking at S-M again

So, S-M points out, and let's say that we agree, that some kind of evaluative facts are necessary for inference to the best explanation. Some kind of evidence is better than other kinds, some explanations are better than others. We have value.

Now, I think that it's relatively uncontroversial (though I could be wrong) that we can pass from evaluative facts to normative facts. If evidence is good, then we ought to believe it, it gives us a reason to believe something. I think all of these notions are exchangeable, but I'm just talking about what seems reasonable to me.

So then there are some normative facts, but they're about epistemic value, epistemic normativity.

So let's say that we can show that facts about epistemic value are indispensable to science (because belief in science means belief in IBE, and this commits you to a host of epistemic values that support and sustain IBE). Where does this leave us with ethical facts?

There's an analogy to be drawn from math. Math is indispensable to science, but not all of math. And so some math gets tossed for being fictional (higher set theory, let's say). And some math gets included in order to round off the actually indispensable mathematics. And some math you are committed to just because it is built off, constructed out of the math that's needed for science. It's part of the theory that's needed.

So, if epistemic normativity is indispensable to science (and that's not a given, and that claim needs to be made more precise) then what relation does ethics have to epistemic normativity? Is it part of the same theory (one unified theory of normativity?) Or maybe it supervenes on epistemic normativity--that would be odd. Not sure what that would mean. Or maybe it's needed to round off and make reasonable the epistemic normativity. Or maybe it's completely irrelevant.