Why is it that mathematical statements seem so darn capable of truth and falsity, while ethical ones seem so darn incapable of being absolutely true or false?
One observation that might seem relevant at first (and clearly is getting at something) is the observation that there is much disagreement about any particular ethical issue, while there is broad agreement about most things in math.
But is widespread disagreement a sign that something isn't objective? Sometimes it seems to be. For example, we all seem to think that taste isn't something true or false. It's not FALSE that chicken tastes bad. That's just one's opinion. And we know that it's an opinion because everybody has a different one. But other times when there is broad disagreement the subject still seems extremely objective. For example, ancient history or the nature of the universe. Both of these fields of study have a large degree of disagreement. Still, we're not in the realm of opinion in ancient history and science of the universe. Rather, the questions are very hard and we don't have so much evidence--that's why everybody who cares has their own opinion!
So, by itself, the observation that there is much disagreement in the field of ethics (and among people in the world as well) indicates nothing, because we find much disagreement both in matters of taste and in matters of history and science.
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I think this may be unfair. The question would be whether you consider it important that (for at least most people) math and ethics are inductive, while science is deductive. When we try to make mathematical or ethical arguments, we don't bring in pieces of evidence from the real world to support our points. This is why I think your argument in the next post (on Mackie) doesn't go through: I don't think that what we would get by looking at external facts is what you mean by ethics. It's more like anthropology, and wouldn't have the power to make normative statements. Maybe I'm not understanding the subtleties of this argument, but this is how it appears to me.
First, I assume that you meant that science is inductive while math and ethics is deductive.
In response to what you wrote, though: in order to settle this we would need to talk about what it means to "bring in pieces of evidence from the real world to support our points." For example, a professor of mine recently gave the example of listening to a piece of music and judging it to be beautiful. If I wanted to support my claim that the piece was beautiful, I would bring the soaring crescendo and wonderful harmony as evidence. Does that count as evidence from the real world? If not, why not? The observation is not COMPLETELY devoid of real world content. But maybe the problem is that the only things that count as real world evidence are things that are ONLY real world content. But is there anything like that? The point made by Harman is that our regular perception of everyday objects isn't like that (against Russell, for example).
So, the point is that if you want to make a distinction between fields that cite real world evidence and fields that don't, you need to do some work. I make this point in a later post ("Philosophy is a Mess").
In any event, all that my point here depends on is the claim that the amount of moral disagreement among experts isn't so wide, such that the best explanation of their disagreement is that ethics is subjective. This point is open to the challenge that there is more disagreement than I think that there is, or that the disagreement is sufficient to warrant the claim that ethics is subjective, but I don't think that this argument forces me to take a position on perception of ethical evidence quite yet. Though I mixed it up, I was trying to make a more limited point here.
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