http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sam-harris/a-science-of-morality_b_567185.html
Why is this debate happening between a pop intellectual figure and a physicist? Why is Sam Harris attempting to do moral philosophy without any training or background, and why is he engaging with the philosophical thought of a physicist (however cogent) instead of the experts in moral philosophy? Would he consider calling a really-smart philosopher to discuss the implications of physics or neuroscience?
I can think of a couple of explanations for this:
1) Sam Harris thinks that philosophy is easy. So he can do it.
2) Sam Harris thinks that philosophers are stupid.
3) Sam Harris is completely ignorant of philosophy.
I have to admit, I'm a little bit confused by the fact that people take him seriously. Sam Harris seems like a fool, as far as I can tell, and it makes me wonder whether I'm just wrong in my evaluation of him. But if I'm not wrong, then some philosophers should put him in his place. Korsgaard, please?
Sunday, May 9, 2010
Outlne of the main argument of "Self-Constitution"
As far as I can tell, this is Korsgaard's picture of things
1. "Every object and activity is defined by certain standards that are both constitutive of it and normative for it." (32) For activities, a standard is called a constitutive principle in the case that "if you are not guided by the principle, you are not performing the activity at all." (28)
2. "The function of an action is to constitute an agent." (82)
3. "The function of an action is to render one efficacious and autonomous" (83). This is because being efficacious and autonomous are constitutive standards for being an agent.
4. In addition, "It is essential [/constitutive] to the concept of agency that the agent be unified" (18) This is because "in order to be autonomous, it is essential that your movements be caused by you." (213)
5. In the case of humans, unifying one's agency (through deliberation) is work that needs to be done before any self-conscious action is possible.
6. Justice is how we unify our own agency, and so "Platonic justice is a constitutive principle of action." This is identical to the categorical imperative (213).
7. All of this assures that one will be inwardly just. But one who is inwardly just will be outwardly just as well, since reasons the kind of unity you need is a unity not just of your person, but a kind of unity that counts the reasons of everyone, ala Nagel.
1. "Every object and activity is defined by certain standards that are both constitutive of it and normative for it." (32) For activities, a standard is called a constitutive principle in the case that "if you are not guided by the principle, you are not performing the activity at all." (28)
2. "The function of an action is to constitute an agent." (82)
3. "The function of an action is to render one efficacious and autonomous" (83). This is because being efficacious and autonomous are constitutive standards for being an agent.
4. In addition, "It is essential [/constitutive] to the concept of agency that the agent be unified" (18) This is because "in order to be autonomous, it is essential that your movements be caused by you." (213)
5. In the case of humans, unifying one's agency (through deliberation) is work that needs to be done before any self-conscious action is possible.
6. Justice is how we unify our own agency, and so "Platonic justice is a constitutive principle of action." This is identical to the categorical imperative (213).
7. All of this assures that one will be inwardly just. But one who is inwardly just will be outwardly just as well, since reasons the kind of unity you need is a unity not just of your person, but a kind of unity that counts the reasons of everyone, ala Nagel.
Tuesday, May 4, 2010
Is epistemic anti-realism really the same thing as losing the authority of a system of norms? I know that this isn't obvious, and I haven't accepted it naively. The worry is that it isn't. That you can still accept a norm while independently questioning its metaphysical status--that these are just entirely different things.
I don't think that they are, though. As usual, I start with Epistemic Nihilism. If you think that there are no epistemic norms then it's hard to see why you should believe an argument for epistemic nihilism--that's my main argument. I think that nihilism can't help but make practical recommendations--you lose epistemology as a source of authority if there really are no epistemic norms. It's similar to saying that the teacher isn't a fount of reasons. It's the same with epistemic nihilism--epistemology isn't a fount of reasons. You don't actually have reason to believe anything. I take this case to be fairly strong.
And what about other forms of anti-realism? I think that this is a somewhat controversial claim, but that from the realist's perspective this isn't what epistemology means. Hmm...now that I write that I realize that there's something unclear there. Am I resting on the normativity of the meaning of epistemology? Am I saying that for the realist "epistemology" means something different than it does for the expressivist? A little bit. But if so this is kinda weird. The expressivist and the realist aren't even talking about the same domain? That doesn't sound right. Anyway, metaphysical status of norms should be independent of the identification of those norms, in the same way realists about numbers are talking about the same numbers as fictionalists.
So let me try that again. It's not about what epistemology means. It's rather about the reasons that the realist accepts. The realist doesn't accept the expressivist's reasons. Now, this isn't quite right either, because it's the same reasons for both--it's just the metaphysical status of those reasons that is in question.
OK, so let me try this one more time. The issue is whether the expressivist (or any other anti-realist) can give the realist reasons that the realist will respect. On the one hand, yes, they can. They can offer reasons to believe various things, and the realist will interpret them in a certain way, and they will interpret what they are doing in a different way. But all of this is only helpful to the extent that the realist is able to interpret the reason in a realist way. If she can't, then how can we expect her to respect it? It's not the sort of thing she recognizes as having force. Oy, this is problematic too because reasons aren't the sort of thing you choose to respect. I'm not sure. OK.
I don't think that they are, though. As usual, I start with Epistemic Nihilism. If you think that there are no epistemic norms then it's hard to see why you should believe an argument for epistemic nihilism--that's my main argument. I think that nihilism can't help but make practical recommendations--you lose epistemology as a source of authority if there really are no epistemic norms. It's similar to saying that the teacher isn't a fount of reasons. It's the same with epistemic nihilism--epistemology isn't a fount of reasons. You don't actually have reason to believe anything. I take this case to be fairly strong.
And what about other forms of anti-realism? I think that this is a somewhat controversial claim, but that from the realist's perspective this isn't what epistemology means. Hmm...now that I write that I realize that there's something unclear there. Am I resting on the normativity of the meaning of epistemology? Am I saying that for the realist "epistemology" means something different than it does for the expressivist? A little bit. But if so this is kinda weird. The expressivist and the realist aren't even talking about the same domain? That doesn't sound right. Anyway, metaphysical status of norms should be independent of the identification of those norms, in the same way realists about numbers are talking about the same numbers as fictionalists.
So let me try that again. It's not about what epistemology means. It's rather about the reasons that the realist accepts. The realist doesn't accept the expressivist's reasons. Now, this isn't quite right either, because it's the same reasons for both--it's just the metaphysical status of those reasons that is in question.
OK, so let me try this one more time. The issue is whether the expressivist (or any other anti-realist) can give the realist reasons that the realist will respect. On the one hand, yes, they can. They can offer reasons to believe various things, and the realist will interpret them in a certain way, and they will interpret what they are doing in a different way. But all of this is only helpful to the extent that the realist is able to interpret the reason in a realist way. If she can't, then how can we expect her to respect it? It's not the sort of thing she recognizes as having force. Oy, this is problematic too because reasons aren't the sort of thing you choose to respect. I'm not sure. OK.
Monday, May 3, 2010
Parsimony and Burden of Proof
As I reread my thesis in preparation for my oral exam tomorrow, I'm particularly struck by a poorly thought out argument in the second chapter.
In short, the argument was that the burden of proof could be shifted away from the moral realist by noting there is an unavoidable arbitrariness in epistemology. The problem with this argument is that it doesn't really respond to the parsimony requirement, as provide a route for avoiding it. That wasn't the clearest sentence I've written in my life, so let me try again.
The problem for the Moral Realist is that parsimony requires that we don't believe that which we have no good reason to believe. And the response I offer, essentially, says that there are some cases in which parsimony isn't required. There's actually no parsimony requirement for our most basic beliefs.
Here are a couple concerns with this argument:
1) Does this mean that ANYTHING can avoid the parsimony requirement? Why only things like moral realism, treating our moral intuitions as ways of getting at moral facts?
Well, not anything. It's just that some epistemic beliefs/principles are prior to the parsimony requirement. They just happen to avoid it.
2) That's not going to cut it as a response. What if we took the parsimony requirement to be our first, most basic epistemic principle?
Then there's no room for epistemology, and you can't get going. You need to take some things on without having epistemic reason to if you're going to get anything at all.
3) What happens once we have the parsimony requirement? Don't we reflect on our prior principles and conclude that they turn out, in retrospect, to be problematic since we ought not believe them due to parsimony?
This is a pretty tough challenge, I think. One way to respond to it is to tweak the parsimony requirement so that it doesn't kill epistemology, and I actually think that this is pretty reasonable. It's overly simple to say that the parsimony requirement is that we simply never believe anything without having an epistemic reason. A fine way of putting it is that we don't believe extra things, and "extra" is glossed in the following way: non-elemental beliefs that we have no epistemic reason to believe.
In short, the argument was that the burden of proof could be shifted away from the moral realist by noting there is an unavoidable arbitrariness in epistemology. The problem with this argument is that it doesn't really respond to the parsimony requirement, as provide a route for avoiding it. That wasn't the clearest sentence I've written in my life, so let me try again.
The problem for the Moral Realist is that parsimony requires that we don't believe that which we have no good reason to believe. And the response I offer, essentially, says that there are some cases in which parsimony isn't required. There's actually no parsimony requirement for our most basic beliefs.
Here are a couple concerns with this argument:
1) Does this mean that ANYTHING can avoid the parsimony requirement? Why only things like moral realism, treating our moral intuitions as ways of getting at moral facts?
Well, not anything. It's just that some epistemic beliefs/principles are prior to the parsimony requirement. They just happen to avoid it.
2) That's not going to cut it as a response. What if we took the parsimony requirement to be our first, most basic epistemic principle?
Then there's no room for epistemology, and you can't get going. You need to take some things on without having epistemic reason to if you're going to get anything at all.
3) What happens once we have the parsimony requirement? Don't we reflect on our prior principles and conclude that they turn out, in retrospect, to be problematic since we ought not believe them due to parsimony?
This is a pretty tough challenge, I think. One way to respond to it is to tweak the parsimony requirement so that it doesn't kill epistemology, and I actually think that this is pretty reasonable. It's overly simple to say that the parsimony requirement is that we simply never believe anything without having an epistemic reason. A fine way of putting it is that we don't believe extra things, and "extra" is glossed in the following way: non-elemental beliefs that we have no epistemic reason to believe.
Thursday, April 29, 2010
Reading Gibbard, Chap 4
Chapter 4--Normative Psychology
"Competing Systems of Control"--He starts by thinking about "weakness of will" cases. In this section Gibbard distinguishes between animal control system and the normative control system. The normative control system is posited to be only a motivating force for humans, and to have a lot to do with language. A norm is a linguistically encoded precept. The normative control system has a lot to do with language, and that "a lot" has to do with coordination problems and planning problems. This is just supposed to be a good start, not the end of the story. But in this section we get conflicts between normative and animal control systems.
"Conflicts with Social Motivations"--In this section we get conflicts with social motivations and the normative control system. Above we didn't have conflicts between norms. This time we have conflicts between norms. But it's not symmetric. It's the difference between two psychological states, that of accepting a norm and that of being in the grip of a norm.
"Biological Adaptation"--Some scientific speculation. He admits that more solid investigation is needed, and he invites it. The biological function of a faculty for accepting and being governed by norms is coordination. The capacity to accept norms and being in their grip are both coordination systems, though the former is distinctly human, and depends on language.
"The Biology of Coordination"--"It is in the role of language in coordinating behavior and expectations, I shall be suggesting, that we can discern what is special about accepting norms."
"Internalizing Norms"--This term refers to what being in the grip of a norm and accepting a norm have in common. Animals are capable of internalizing norms. No decision involved, it's just built into their instincts. e.g. conversational distance. Sophisticated observers can formulate these norms, though usually those who respect the norms aren't able to even notice them. "What then might we mean here by a norm? By the norm itself I suggest, we should mean simply a prescription or imperative that gives the rule a sophisticated observer could formulate." To internalize a norm is to have a motivational tendency to act on that pattern.
"Accepting Norms"--"The state of accepting a norm is identified b its place in a syndrome of tendencies toward action and avowal. This has to do with the language-infused system of coordination peculiar to humans. We accept norms in the context of normative discusion, actual and imaginary. We take positions and thereby expose ourselves to deamnds for consistency.
"Acceptance, Action, Persuasion"
"Normative Discussion and Philosophy" [Skipped these sections.]
"Competing Systems of Control"--He starts by thinking about "weakness of will" cases. In this section Gibbard distinguishes between animal control system and the normative control system. The normative control system is posited to be only a motivating force for humans, and to have a lot to do with language. A norm is a linguistically encoded precept. The normative control system has a lot to do with language, and that "a lot" has to do with coordination problems and planning problems. This is just supposed to be a good start, not the end of the story. But in this section we get conflicts between normative and animal control systems.
"Conflicts with Social Motivations"--In this section we get conflicts with social motivations and the normative control system. Above we didn't have conflicts between norms. This time we have conflicts between norms. But it's not symmetric. It's the difference between two psychological states, that of accepting a norm and that of being in the grip of a norm.
"Biological Adaptation"--Some scientific speculation. He admits that more solid investigation is needed, and he invites it. The biological function of a faculty for accepting and being governed by norms is coordination. The capacity to accept norms and being in their grip are both coordination systems, though the former is distinctly human, and depends on language.
"The Biology of Coordination"--"It is in the role of language in coordinating behavior and expectations, I shall be suggesting, that we can discern what is special about accepting norms."
"Internalizing Norms"--This term refers to what being in the grip of a norm and accepting a norm have in common. Animals are capable of internalizing norms. No decision involved, it's just built into their instincts. e.g. conversational distance. Sophisticated observers can formulate these norms, though usually those who respect the norms aren't able to even notice them. "What then might we mean here by a norm? By the norm itself I suggest, we should mean simply a prescription or imperative that gives the rule a sophisticated observer could formulate." To internalize a norm is to have a motivational tendency to act on that pattern.
"Accepting Norms"--"The state of accepting a norm is identified b its place in a syndrome of tendencies toward action and avowal. This has to do with the language-infused system of coordination peculiar to humans. We accept norms in the context of normative discusion, actual and imaginary. We take positions and thereby expose ourselves to deamnds for consistency.
"Acceptance, Action, Persuasion"
"Normative Discussion and Philosophy" [Skipped these sections.]
Reading, Gibbard, Chap 3
Chapter 3: Analysis Broached
"What is Appraised as Rational or Not"--in this section he argues that beliefs, actions and emotions can all be appraised as rational or not. Some say that only voluntary things can be rationally appraised, but Gibbard thinks that beliefs are a counter-example to this, and actions aren't entirely voluntary anyway (since they have to do with intentions, which aren't entirely voluntary, I think). So there's nothing against emotions being rationally appraised, which is what he really needs for his account. You might say that emotions are rationally appraised to the extent that they're based on beliefs that can be rationally appraised (as Hume argued), but Gibbard argues that these beliefs would have to be subconscious, and only make themselves present to the extent that the person gets angry, so you might as well just say that anger is rationally evaluated.
"Rationality and Morality"--Gibbard makes several distinctions in this section in order to focus in on morality, and to give an analysis of the relationship between morality and rationality. First, he distinguishes subjective from objective morality. Subjective morality is what an agent should do given his beliefs and knowledge, and objective morality is what an agent should do if she had perfect knowledge, or something. Gibbard says that he sees no interest in objective morality, so he's only interested in the subjective stuff. Then he distinguishes between blameworthiness and morality, so that he's only giving an account of morality (which is forward looking, as opposed to blameworthiness, which is retrospective). As an account of blameworthiness he gives "iff it is rational for the agent to feel guilty over the act and for others to resent him for it." Instead, he gives an account for moral wrongness: "an act is wrong if and only if it violates standards for ruling out actions, such that if an agent in a normal frame of mind violated those standards because he was not substantially motivated to conform to them, he would be to blame." So it's an account of morality built out of the retrospective attitude of blame. Blame depends on standards of subjective wrongness and standards for responsibility, so Gibbard defines what a moral wrong is by blocking out one of the factors for blame (the standards for responsibility).
"The Norm-Expressivistic Analysis"--The previous section gave an analysis of morality, and here we get a provisional analysis of rationality. "Put roughly and cryptically, my hypothesis is that to think something rational is to accept norms that permit it." Accepting norms is a state of mind, so naturally basic. "An observer believes an action, belief, or attitude A of mine to be rational if and only if he accepts norms that permit A for my circumstances." We here get the idea that "moral norms are norms for the rationality of guilt and resentment."
"Second Thoughts"--He clarifies what he means by rationality, and I skimmed this section. Same with morality. He's interested not in what the terms mean, but rather with the particular meanings that he's associating with them. He's happy to call these terms something else.
"Structural Problems"--On this account, the question "Is it ever rational not to be moral" makes perfect sense. Likewise, we can understand perfectly well what it means to ask whether the "moral ought implies can." Another question also makes sense: "It morality of value?" The norm-expressivistic analysis gives us an interpretation of this question too: "Is it a good thing for norms for guilt and resentment to play a big role in our lives? Or might other kinds of motivation...bring many of the same benefits without the same costs." (See Nietzsche). All he's doing is showing how powerful and flexible his framework is, and trying to show you that it is a good analysis of what's been going on this whole time. "Familiar problems can be put in new form, as questions about the structure of well-founded sentiments."
"What is Appraised as Rational or Not"--in this section he argues that beliefs, actions and emotions can all be appraised as rational or not. Some say that only voluntary things can be rationally appraised, but Gibbard thinks that beliefs are a counter-example to this, and actions aren't entirely voluntary anyway (since they have to do with intentions, which aren't entirely voluntary, I think). So there's nothing against emotions being rationally appraised, which is what he really needs for his account. You might say that emotions are rationally appraised to the extent that they're based on beliefs that can be rationally appraised (as Hume argued), but Gibbard argues that these beliefs would have to be subconscious, and only make themselves present to the extent that the person gets angry, so you might as well just say that anger is rationally evaluated.
"Rationality and Morality"--Gibbard makes several distinctions in this section in order to focus in on morality, and to give an analysis of the relationship between morality and rationality. First, he distinguishes subjective from objective morality. Subjective morality is what an agent should do given his beliefs and knowledge, and objective morality is what an agent should do if she had perfect knowledge, or something. Gibbard says that he sees no interest in objective morality, so he's only interested in the subjective stuff. Then he distinguishes between blameworthiness and morality, so that he's only giving an account of morality (which is forward looking, as opposed to blameworthiness, which is retrospective). As an account of blameworthiness he gives "iff it is rational for the agent to feel guilty over the act and for others to resent him for it." Instead, he gives an account for moral wrongness: "an act is wrong if and only if it violates standards for ruling out actions, such that if an agent in a normal frame of mind violated those standards because he was not substantially motivated to conform to them, he would be to blame." So it's an account of morality built out of the retrospective attitude of blame. Blame depends on standards of subjective wrongness and standards for responsibility, so Gibbard defines what a moral wrong is by blocking out one of the factors for blame (the standards for responsibility).
"The Norm-Expressivistic Analysis"--The previous section gave an analysis of morality, and here we get a provisional analysis of rationality. "Put roughly and cryptically, my hypothesis is that to think something rational is to accept norms that permit it." Accepting norms is a state of mind, so naturally basic. "An observer believes an action, belief, or attitude A of mine to be rational if and only if he accepts norms that permit A for my circumstances." We here get the idea that "moral norms are norms for the rationality of guilt and resentment."
"Second Thoughts"--He clarifies what he means by rationality, and I skimmed this section. Same with morality. He's interested not in what the terms mean, but rather with the particular meanings that he's associating with them. He's happy to call these terms something else.
"Structural Problems"--On this account, the question "Is it ever rational not to be moral" makes perfect sense. Likewise, we can understand perfectly well what it means to ask whether the "moral ought implies can." Another question also makes sense: "It morality of value?" The norm-expressivistic analysis gives us an interpretation of this question too: "Is it a good thing for norms for guilt and resentment to play a big role in our lives? Or might other kinds of motivation...bring many of the same benefits without the same costs." (See Nietzsche). All he's doing is showing how powerful and flexible his framework is, and trying to show you that it is a good analysis of what's been going on this whole time. "Familiar problems can be put in new form, as questions about the structure of well-founded sentiments."
Reading Gibbard, I
"The analysis is non-cognitivistic in the narrow sense that, according to it, to call a thing rational is not to state a matter of fact, either truly or falsely. None of this leaves normative language defective or second-rate. The analysis explains why we need normative language, and as it takes shape, it ascribes to rationality many of the features on which theories of normative fact insist. In many ways, normative judgments mimic factual judgments, and indeed factual judgments themselves rest on norms--norms for belief. Normative discussion is much like factual discussion, I shall be claiming, and just as indispensable."
I really need to keep this in mind when thinking about expressivism. Because of the 60s I tend to think of non-cognitivism as looking down on ethics and other normative talk, but it's really not doing that in today's age. What is at stake--the only thing at stake--is whether one can say of normative statements that they're true or false.
I really need to keep this in mind when thinking about expressivism. Because of the 60s I tend to think of non-cognitivism as looking down on ethics and other normative talk, but it's really not doing that in today's age. What is at stake--the only thing at stake--is whether one can say of normative statements that they're true or false.
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